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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken pursuant to the authority of Rules 3 
and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals (now the Utah 
Rules of Apellate Procedure) and pursuant to the authority of 
Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3, paragraph 2(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. The issue for the decision of the Court of Appeal is: 
Did the Responsent establish that there was a substan-
tial change in circumstances sufficient to support the Court's 
ordered Modification of the Decree of Divorce? 
B. The standard of appellate review is set forth in a 
number of Utah cases. Appellant refers the Court to the 
following cases and the accompanying quotations from such cases: 
1. Naylor v. Naylor 700 P.2d 707 (1985): 
On a petition for a modification of a divorce decree, 
the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of a 
substantial change of circumstances occurring since the 
entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree 
itself. JId. at 710. 
2. Jeppson v^ Jeppson 684 P.2d 69 (1984): 
Modificaton of a divorce decree is an equitable 
matter. Although this Court may review both the facts 
and the law, Christensen v. Christense Utah, 628 P.2d 
1297, 1299 (1981), we typically accord "considerable 
deference to the judgment of the trial court due to its 
advantaged position and will not disturb the action of 
that court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to 
the contrary, or the trial court abuses its discretion 
or misapplies principles of law." Id., Accord, e.g. 
Openshaw v. Openshaw, Utah, 639 P.2d 177 (1982); 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 1218 (1980). See 
also Lord v^ Shaw [682 P.2d 853 (1984); Turner v^ 
Turner, Utah, 649 P.2d 6 (1982). 
A p a r t y who r e q u e s t s a m o d i f i c a t i o n of a d i v o r c e 
decree must i n i t i a l l y show t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l change in 
t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of a t l e a s t one of t h e p a r t i e s h a s 
o c c u r r e d . . . . A r e l a t i v e change i n t h e income and 
expenses of t he p a r t i e s , i f compara t ive ly s i g n i f i c a n t , 
can amount t o a s u b s t a n t i a l change of c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
STATUTES 
Utah Code T i t l e 30, C h a p t e r 3 , s e c t i o n 5, p a r a g r a p h 3 
s t a t e s : 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental 
care, or the distribution of the property as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Respondent petitioned the Court for a Modification of 
the Decree of Divorce previously entered on March 10, 1983. The 
Court, Judge Rigtrup presiding, granted the Petition for 
Modification and increased the amount of child support for the 
one remaining minor child from $175.00 per month to $300.00 per 
month. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time that the original Decree of Divorce was entered, 
the Appellant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of 
$175.00 per month for the two minor children of the parties based 
upon monthly gross income of $3,138.58 (Findings of Fact re: 
Modification, paragraph 10, pg 4). 
At the time of the 1983 Decree, the Respondent was earning 
gross monthly income of $1,401.00 (Findings of Fact re: 
Modification, paragraph 13, pg 4). The Appellant was then 
earning 2.24 times the amount earned by the Respondent. 
By the time that the Modification was granted, the Appellant 
was earning $4,100.00 per month (Findings of Fact 
re: Modification, paragraph 12, pg 4); and the Respondent was 
earning $1,429.00 per month as gross income. (Findings of Fact, 
re: Modification, paragraph 15, pg 4). The Appellant was then 
earning 2.92 times the amount earned by the Respondent. 
The Court did not consider the income added to the household 
of the Respondent as a result of the Respondents spouse's 
contributions, nor did it consider the income earned by the minor 
child of the parties. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED A MODIFICATION OF THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AS THERE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WAS A 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES BETWEEN THE TIME OF THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND THE PETITION FOR MODIFICATION. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IS GRANTED ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE 
RESPONDENT FAILED TO MAKE SUCH A SHOWING IN THIS MATTER. 
The facts of the case as set forth in the Findings of Fact 
prepared by the Respondent are that in the five years between the 
entry of the original Decree of Divorce and the filing of the 
Petition for Modification, the Appellant's income went from 2.42 
times the Respondent's income to 2.92 times the Respondent's 
income. In other words, the Appellant's income increased by 31 
percent over the five year span while the Respondent's actual 
income increased by but two percent over the same period of time. 
However, the Court did not consider the contributions to the 
income of the Respondent's household made by the Respondent's 
spouse, nor the contributions to the Respondent's household made 
by the minor child, who was of the age of sixteen at the time of 
the hearing of the matter. In fact, the Court stated from the 
bench: 
Based upon the proffered evidence, the Court does 
find that there was a substantial and material 
change of circumstances. 
I think all the national studies and those of 
us that are parents understand that braces and 
glasses and the things that are involved, clothing, 
other items, become more costly. So the Court does 
observe the increase in age. . . . So, we understand 
that there are costs incurred. The difference 
between 37,600 in 1983 in adjusted income in 1988 
exceeding 50,000 [sic] is a significant increase. 
The Court understands there's cost of living 
increases at both homes, and it has the same affect 
[sic] on both households. But I think it's clear 
from what our Intermediate Court of Appeals has said 
that the children are entitled to an adjustment for 
part of the increases in revenue achieved. 
Decision, p. 2, lines 5-21. 
The sole factor considered by the Court, with any degree of 
specificity, was the Appellant's 31 percent increase in income. 
The 1978 Utah case of Owen vs. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 states the 
very basic proposition that "there can be no justification for 
changing the decree unless there is a showing of substantial 
change in circumstances." l^d. at 912. The case further states: 
While the increase in the defendants income is 
certainly an important factor to consider, this 
proposition is also true: the fact that a man may so 
use his abilities as to increase his income should 
not necessarily impose a penalty upon him by 
automatically increasing his obligations under a 
divorce decree. The increase in income is only to be 
considered along with the other facts and 
circumstances concerning the needs of the children 
and the ability of the father and mother to provide 
for them. Jxi. at 913 
The error made by the trial Court in this matter was the 
failure of the Court to consider "other facts and circumstances 
concerning the needs of the children and the ability of the 
father and mother to provide for them." supra. 
The burden of proving a change of circumstances rests on the 
party seeking the modification (See Christensen v. Christensen, 
628 P.2d 1297, 1299 (1981) and the Respondent failed to prove 
that there was a substantial change in circumstances as no proof 
was proffered concerning the monetary needs of the children or 
the ability of the mother and her spouse to pay for the children. 
The fact that the Appellant!s income increased by 31 percent 
over the time period is not, in itself, proof positive that there 
has been a substantial change in circumstances. The matter of 
Jeppson v. Jeppson 684 P.2d 69 (1984) speaks to the issue of 
termination of an award of alimony six years after the entry of 
the Divorce decree. The Court found that the child of the 
parties voluntarily moved from wife!s residence, that the husband 
now carried the burden of child support for the child, and that 
the wife had sustantial assets with which to support herself. 
Addressing the issue of a modification in the decree, the Court 
states: 
A party who requests a modification of a divorce 
decree must initially show that a substantial change 
in the circumstances of at least one of the parties 
has occurred. . . . A relative change in the income 
and expenses of the parties, if comparatively 
significant, can amount to a substantial change in 
circumstances. _Id_. at 70. 
Adding to the above criteria regarding the granting of a 
modification, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Naylor v. 
Naylor, 700 P.2d 707 (1985), comments that: 
On a petition for modification of a divorce decree, 
the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of 
a substantial change of circumstances occurring since 
the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the 
decree itself. Id., at 710 
In Naylor, it was contemplated that the wife's income would 
increase at a rate commensurate with the income of the husband, 
however, while the husband's income doubled, the wife's income 
remained the same. In the instant case, there was no 
speculation or contemplation at the time of the divorce regarding 
the Respondent's projected income. The Appellant's income has 
also not doubled, but has increased but 31 percent over the five 
years, an average raise of but six percent per annum. Finally, 
there was no evidence produced at trial regarding the minor 
child's increased expenses. 
There was no proof of increased expenses, no proof of the 
Respondent's husband's income, and no substantial change in 
circumstances when the Appellant receives but a six percent raise 
per year. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent did not meet the burden of proof necessary to 
establish a substantial change in circumstances warranting an 
increase of 100% in the amount of child support paid. The 
Respondent did show there was an increase of 31 percent in the 
Appellant's income, but nothing was proved or offered concerning 
increased expenses of the child, the contribution of income of 
the spouse of the Respondent to the household, or the need of the 
child for additional support of 100%. 
Therefore, the matter should be remanded to the trial court 
with an order instructing the trial court to dismiss the Petition 
for Modification and granting to the Appellant his costs and 
fees. 
Dated this \ day of April, 1990. 
DEAN H. BECKER 
Attorney for Appellant 
